Top Links for 2012

Quantum Stuff
Quantum Life - Until Recently it was thought that quantum entanglements could only take place at very low temperatures. New research however suggests they play a role in living systems.Seth Loyd on Quantum Life
Everywhere in a Flash: The Quantum Physics of Photosynthesis
NOVA | The Fabric of the Cosmos: Quantum Leap



Deep, Beautiful, & Elegant Annual Questions from Edge.org
The Principle of Least Action
Frames of Reference
Falling Into Place: Entropy, Galileo's Frames of Reference, and the Desperate Ingenuity Of Life



Right Brain/Left Brain Asymmetry
Psychiatrist Iain McGilchrist describes the real differences between the left and right halves of the human brain. It's not simply "emotion on the right, reason on the left," but something far more complex and interesting
Iain McGilchrist: The divided brain

Mike Gazzaniga
Recent Interview with Gazzaniga and split brain patient 'Joe'

Marshmellow Studies
The Secret of Self-Control
Reconsidering the Marshmallow Test



Robert Saplosky & Stress
Under Pressure: The Search for a Stress Vaccine
Stress, Neurodegeneration and Individual Differences by Robert Sapolsky

Moving Naturalism Forward
Videos


Change Blindness
Video

 

Uncertainty
SCIENCE IS NOT ABOUT CERTAINTY: A PHILOSOPHY OF PHYSICS
The Buddha, Topoi, And Quantum Gravity

Symmetry Breaking- Phase changes & Moral Progress

"In nature things move violently to their place, and calmly in their place"
— Sir Francis Bacon


Towards the end of the prior session on morality the discussion moved in the direction of finding explanation for the positive historical progression in morality. This discussion was led by Don Ross and carried over into the early section of the next video : Here

Summary of the Discussion

Don Ross discusses how moral dynamics can be modeled by game theory by discussing another example of moral progress. Prior to WWII the tribes of New Guinea each lived in a valley. Every tribe was permanently at war with every other tribe. Individuals from each tribe were unable to move from their valley safely because any contact between members of opposing tribes would result in bloodshed or death. It was however necessary for tribes to venture up the mountain which entailed great risk of coming into contact of other tribes. These were the dynamics of the structural equilibrium that had come to be.

Ross describes how there very well may have been thoughtful individuals questioning whether there could be a better alternative to this seemingly intractable dilemma. When an equilibrium has set in however, no one individual (or 10 individuals) acting out an alternative approach can change the established dynamic. With the onset of WWII, foreign troops infiltrated the island and in the process the previous equilibrium had its symmetry dramatically unsettled. The presence and location of the troops created a constraint on the pattern of violence allowing the tribes people  to more freely access the mountain without fear of slaughter from the competing tribes. This accidental consequence allowed the great majority of the tribes people to experience an alternative to the previous equilibrium and within one generation the tribes of New Guinea were no longer warring with each other.

Prior to the arrival of the invasive elements it would have been far too risky and unproductive for a small minority to change the dynamics. At that stage it is much easier and a more successful survival strategy to rationalize the current state of things. This rationalization likely took the form of adopting moral codes of honor, vengeance, and obviously distrust of those outside the tribe. Once a critical number of inhabitants were exposed to a different way the societal moral codes quickly changed.

My Commentary

The point obviously is not to suggest that war or imperialism leads to positive consequences. I expect that there were also negative consequences for the tribes people as well. The dynamics involved however, in the cultural change are interesting. From a pessimistic point of view this suggests that the symmetry of cultural dynamics in a state of equilibrium can be difficult to break in a bottom-up fashion. From an optimistic point of view however, the adaptive capacity for societal change can be dramatic once the symmetry is broken and a new vantage point can be taken.

This example reminds me of the process that collections of H2O molecules undergo when exposed to different climates. H2O molecules do not have an intrinsic (foundational) state of solid, liquid or gas. Instead the state of the collection of molecules will change phase when extrinsic influences cause the temperature to reach certain critical thresholds. The temperature change is continuous, but at these critical points a symmetry is broken. At this point the change is no longer simply continuous and quantitative, but a instead a qualitative change emerges (see detailed explanation here) such as water from ice.

Minds however are different from collections of H20 molecule in important ways. I would like to believe that a mind has the intrinsic capacity to change it's view. I am suggesting that we can view a single phenomena from multiple perspectives. If we go about our viewing receptively a capacity for creativity emerges. The Taoist philosopher Chaung Tzu put it this way.

When you break something up, you create things.
When you create something, you destroy things.
Material things have no creation or destruction.
Ultimately these concepts connect as one.

If we are receptive to potential alternatives beyond the current norm we may be able to break the symmetry of destructive cycles.  Often it appears as though it takes an event that grabs hold of many minds to create a receptivity to alternatives.

The recent tragic mass shooting of young children may be such an event. There is an increase in the receptivity to changing the gun laws in our country that may be reaching a critical threshold. I am in favor of more regulations (constraints) surrounding this issue. I believe reasonable constraints applied to the process of owning guns has potential to reduce the cycle of violence that is responsible for the majority of gun related homicides. Ironically, the rare tragic events that are changing minds are responsible for a small minority of the homicides and may be less susceptible to prevention. While these tragic mass murders have been increasing in frequency, overall rates have been in decline.






While the overall rates have been in decline, they remain at unacceptable and unnecessarily high levels. This is a complex problem that I think needs to be addressed on many levels. I would like to see a collective wave of increased awareness to the issue of our moral foundations. In the prior discussion there was a general consensus agreement that there are no absolute foundational moral values. Steven Weinberg took this further suggesting that this implied that 'we have to live the unexamined life'. Using Hitler as an example he takes the position that vengeance can be an appropriate response, not for the purpose of deterrence, or the protection of society in the future, but simply because 'he is evil'. If we accept that there is no absolute moral foundational code are we restricted to following our intuitions, or is there a way to live an examined life that helps promote well-being among individuals, groups and society as whole?

I believe we can live an examined life that informs our intuitions. We can ask the ourselves the question 'what is being complemented and what is being constrained'. Deterrence of violence due to individual concern of punishment (in some form), and protection from future violence by certain individuals are constraints that may be necessary to improve the general societal well-being. Nature generally shows that interdependent systems that constrain each other are able sustain a progression in complexity. Without these constraints what is left for vengeance? Perhaps vengeance feels as though it can quench an unexamined intuition, but what type of cycle is this likely to encourage. History informs us that unconstrained vengeance will spiral in a destructive fashion.

Vengeance is a common theme driving the violence expressed in gang culture. There also is no shortage of popular movies glorifying the morality of vengeance and rarely do they consider alternatives. Some have pointed to the way culture can shape the expression of mental dysfunction.   Punishment may be useful as a deterrent to some degree (constraining violent behavior). In some cases to protect society, those who are unable respond to attempts at rehabilitation may need to have their access to society removed. Vengeance by itself however only feeds the cycle of destruction. As long as vengeance is celebrated as a foundational moral code it will be difficult to break the symmetry of this cycle.

There is an alternative approach. Vengeance with it's capacity for self amplification exemplifies a positive feedback cycle. Positive feedback cycles by their nature are unstable, unsustainable and escalate rapidly in one direction. In contrast negative feedback cycles seek a stable and sustainable balance through a process of complementary constraint. Can we envision a justice system that seeks to enhance individual and societal well-being through well considered constraints? One where the constraints on violent expression leads to a progressive societal stability and each progression of societal stability lessens the need for external constraints?

"The unexamined life is not worth living"
Plato

Moving Naturalism Forward - Part 5- Morality

The discussion of the topic of morality was introduced in two parts by Rebecca Goldstein, and Steven Weinberg respectively.

As I have with the other discussions I will try to sumarize the disscussions first and my comments will follow.

The video can be found here:

Goldstien sees the issue of whether or not we can 'ground' morality as a non-issue. She indicates we have been doing it, there is a 'forward movement' and philosophy in her view has played an important role in that progress. Richard Dawkins and others will later chime in showing agreement with a collective historical progression of morality. As an example of the forward movement of morality Dawkins points out that T.H. Huxley, who was extremely progressive considering 19th century norms would have never even considered that black people could be intellectually comparable to white people, Goldstein decribes how we look back with 'horror' on the accepted morality in even the quite recent past. She reccounts how a person in the room admitted that as a young man he took it as a given that women could not do math and physics. Jenna Levin then smart quips 'which one of you said that'? So the session gets off to a good natured start as the response is laughter.

Goldstein continues, suggesting that our grandchildren will look back on some our current actions with the same horror. She points out that once progress is made we almost never go back. Using slavery as an example there was one reversal with Napoleon for a short time. She says historically, 1st philosophers point out a moral problem, then there is something that effects a larger public awareness. In case of slavery she points to Lockes argument against slavery which preceded the novel 'Uncle Toms Cabin' which had a huge effect. 'There is a place for reason here'.

Goldstein says she is interested in the work of evolutionary psychology and Johnathan Haidt, although she strongly disagrees with his conclusions. Evolutionary psychology can help inform why we hold some of the moral intuitions we do, but reason is necessary to consider if we ought to hold them. The response of disgust which probably evolved in response to things like food borne pathogens is used as an example. Out of that intuitive response the morality of purity was probably born. Goldstein herself was brought up to moralize around foods and initialy had a 'moral revulsion' to lard. Reason however has allowed her to see the irrationality of that response. She also cites group loyalty, and authority as examples. One defining point is that 'moral psychology without moral philosophy is insufficient'. Her second point is that we can ground our morality in the fact that we matter. From that place moral reasoning can expand (to others).

Steven Weinberg agrees we can reason about morality, but we cannot 'ground' morality in reason or science. There are no absolute moral postulates. Weinberg is arguing against the case made by Sam Harris that moral postulates can be grounded in science. He also argues that even nice people lack coherent moral postulates, by using himself as an example. In highschool Weinberg held a utilitarian stance (the greatest happyness, for the most people). He then read 'Brave New World' in which a world was portayed where every one was happy, but there was no justice, no culture, no search for meaning. This led him to see shortcomings in the utilitarian posture. Other examples include his loyalty to his family, and his moral feelings relating to evil and vengence. Vengence is not problematic to Weinberg in that he believes evil should be punished for its own sake above and beyond the value gained from deterence or societal protection. Weinberg sees 'no algorythm' for balancing things like 'happyness and truth', 'loyalty and distributive justice'. At one point he concludes that this is not a problem, 'so what, thats OK'. He also concludes however, that 'we have to live the unexamined life', and 'this is part of the tragedy of the human condition'. It seems Weinberg feels we cannot reason our way to moral philosophy because there are no absolute moral postulates. Goldstein agrees there are no absolute postulates, but that does not imply that reason can not play an important role for reason in the unfolding of morality.

Massimo Pigliucci agrees with Weinberg with regard to the limits of utilitarianism and his criticism of Sam Harris's position. He points out that there are ethical frameworks (virtue ethics, communitarianism) that address the family loyalty dilemma. He states that moral reasoning in philosophy is not hinged to grounding morality on a bedrock or to providing universal answers. It is instead a way of thinking things through. In ethics we do have to start with some assumptions or axioms, but this true for everything we do (science, math, logic). Pigliucci reccomends the books of Michael Sandel as a useful example of how to reason in this way. He also cites Peter Singers 'Exanding Circle' as an approach to the problem of our distrust for others. Weinberg is unconvinced, and unable to see how a rational process can inform his core moral feelings. Dan Dennet points out that not all rational processes are 'fact finding processes'.

Don Ross points out how the process that informs our moral values is extemely complex at multiple levels, yet we are pretty good at it. Ross highlights an interesting personal example of dramatic moral progress. When he was a child his parents held the view that gay people were on a level with criminals. They held the belief that gays should not be allowed to participate in society. His parents who are still living now hold a typical liberal view and have gay freinds. He feels this was a very gradual process 'there was no magic line crossed' Due largely to a societal process in which we all are continuosly indoctrinating each other change took hold. Goldstein makes an important point that I felt she had skimmed over before. In addition to the top-down societal pressure that Ross describes a bottom-up spark for change often comes from those who are being wronged through their organizing and advocating for justice. She notes that (other) animals can't do this.

Owen Flanagan then brings two import ideas together that provide insight to the discussion that has been ongoing. The first idea is that of an absolute foundational approach to morality, which he points out most naturalists are trying to avoid. The second idea relates to how science can inform moral philosophy. Hume, as Flanagan points out, famously declared 'we cant demonstrate moral facts'. The is known is the naturalistic fallacy, 'is does not imply ought'. Flanagan shows that Hume made this declaration in response to moral clerics who were advocating foundational morality. Hume then continues with 200 pages of moral philosophy, but not with the goal of demonstrating anything in a foundational sense. Flanagan suggests that while it is not logical to think we can derive moral facts from science, we can us science to becomed more informed regarding our nature. The better we are informed regarding our nature the better we can negotiate with each other. Pigliucci agrees pointing out that Hume felt morality was grounded in human nature, and Pigliucci adds that human nature itself is contantly evolving. He points out that Hume recognized that human nature evolves through culture well before the time Darwin.

Terrence Deacon breifly brings the discussion back to the topic of the prior day. He points out that just about everything being discussed could fall under the category of emergence. David Poepple points out in response that 'fermions don't make moral judgements, people do'. He is puzzled by the discontinuity between talking about individual psychology and moral group dynamics. Sean Carroll points out that we can study naturalistically what people do (through psychology), but that does not determine what they should do. We are back to 'is vs ought again'.

This for me has been another intersting and informative discussion. I think there was considerably more agreement then disagreement among the participants. All participants seem to agree that moral values have been  progressing in a positive direction historically. All the participants also seem to believe that there are no absolute moral postulates and therefore it is not productive to go about moralizing in that way. I even think that think all participants agree that reason and science play some role in the agreed upon progression of moral values. I think the primary place where Steven Weinberg clearly disagrees with most others in the room is in regard to the ability of individuals to influence thier own core moral values through reason. This one initial difference however, leads to what I see as an important limiting condition with regard to the philisophical stance that 'we have to live the unexamined life'. People can agree for the most part on what they are looking at, but depending on the frame of reference what is subjectively viewed can seem quite different.

Most appeared to agree that it is important to examine our assumtions, axioms, and biases when balancing the way we think about moral values. This is what I would like to see explored in more depth. I think we can make efficient moral progress if we go about the art of living with this in mind. I also think the concept of complentarity can be very useful in this process. If our assumptions lack a full conception of the dynamics involving the complentary and oppositional ideas present in a given problem then our moral stance will be incompletely informed and biased in some way. In my view bias will always be present to some degree. I feel strongly that we can cultivate a way of living that increases our awareness and reduces our bias.

I am now going to give some examples of how I might apply this concept drawing in part from Terrence Deacons presentation on emergence.

In the simple molecular model Deacon described a system comprised of two sub-processes that complemented each other through their opposition. He describes the complementary opposition as each process constraining the other. The creative process of autocatalysis is constrained by the shell formed from the self assembly process. The self assembly is dependent on (and thus constrained by) what is produced. Together the sub-processes forms a whole and each sub-process 'matters' to the other. This forms a nice metaphor for the 'mattering' which Goldstein refers to as her ground for moral values.

The whole of this simple model however will need further constraints to become a living system. The shell for example will need a degree of permeability to allow energy from the outside to keep it's systems working. The whole of the simple system needs to communicate, and in a sense cooperate with it's environment. In more complex living organisms the organism depends on its cells for life, and the cells depend on the organism to provide ongoing sources of energy. Now we have a very early stage metaphor for selfishness and altruism. Orgnanisms tend to survive natural selection when thier cells are not too greedy or invasive, but instead are constrained to benefit from a balance that allows the organism to flourish. While most relationships between species in nature are symbiotic, some are parasitic. In either case I think the metaphors are informative and useful, but we need to remember that every moral problem is unique. Once again is does not imply ought.

We should not be surprised that human nature expresses itself with both selfish and altruistic traits. According  to the taoist concept of complementarity the exisitence of one requires the other. The question then is not whether human nature is intrinsicly selfish or altruistic. The better question which our conscious process affords  is, 'how can we balance these traits so that they complement each other'?

There is no foundational answer to that question. The value we give each answer will depend on the contextual details of the problem at hand, and the reference frame in which we view it.  So then another series of  important questions appear;  'What are my assumptions', 'How might my frame of reference be biased', 'How might I complement my reference frame to constrain its bias? It is very difficult to see the bias in our reference frame as it is the lens though which we look. With that as a given I think it is best to make use of all of our tools; our reason, our science, and our introspection with a receptivity to the idea that there will always be a 'missing complement' waiting to be discovered. From my frame of reference that is not a 'tradgedy', but a simultaneously practical and elegant path toward progress.

Edit: The discussion on morality continues into the next video

Don Ross presents a very interesting real world example pertaining to the issue of vengence. I will at some point describe that in another post and than continue to address some of the examples of moral problems brought up in the discussion.

Update:

Here is a nice link on some eastern meditative approaches or practices intended to improve our tools for ethical behavior.
Practical Ethics

Moving Naturalism Forward - Part 4- Emergence(2)

I am creating a place holder here as I plan to post on the 2nd video  from the conference on the topic of emergence at a later date.

The video can be found Here

Moving Naturalism Forward - Part 3- Emergence

Emergent phenomena are often defined in one of three ways:

1) if the behavior of a phenomena is not simply the sum of it's reducible parts
2) if the behavior of a phenomena is not predictable given full knowledge of it's parts
3) if the behavior of a phenomena exhibits novel causal efficacy not exhibited by it's parts

For those looking for more background on the topic, the philosopher Massimo Pigliucci presented a four part commentary on some important papers in the field at these 4 links: part 1, part 2, part 3, part 4

The discussion at the 'Moving Naturalism Forward ' conference that I will now summarize was introduced by Terrence Deacon and can be found here.

I found Deacons approach to the topic very compelling.  I would recommend anyone interested in the topic to check out the first 2 to 25 minutes of the video where his approach is spelled out.

Deacon begins by addressing the question 'What fits in naturalism'? Deacon feels that Rosenberg's approach and that of most naturalists in general is overly eliminative. In particular Deacon would like find a place for teleology ('organisms have an end-directedness') in biology. While most in the room would consider Deacon to be an anti-reductionist he considers what he does to make full use of reduction. He feels however that meaning has causal efficacy in the world, and that we need to think in terms of 'processes and dynamical complexities' to begin to address how this may come to be.

Deacon does not feel that talk of bottom-up and top-down causality is useful. He feels that the organization of the structural dynamics is what really matters. 'The work' he states 'is mostly done by constraints' on structural relationships. The constraints determine 'what does happen, not just what could happen'.  In Deacons view the causality in the world  is not in the 'stuff', but in the 'organization'.

Don Ross suggests that Deacon talk scales rather than levels which Deacon is fine with. Steven Weinberg however, is adamant that the language of  levels is retained. He as a particle physicist feels there is a 'fundamental level of truth which determines every thing at higher levels'. Ross is on board with getting away from the top-down, bottom-up trap in compositional terms. He would like to employ scales in relation to how universal a theory is. In this way he sees quantum field theory as universal. Using Deacons terminology quantum field theory would constrain other theories.  I agree and my reading of this is that complementarity would be perhaps the general universal principal that applies to all scales of emergence. Deacon provides a slightly less general, but more explanatory model that incorporates a type of complementary interdependence.

Deacon is very interested in the origin of life and approaches emergence from that vantage point. The origin of life had to in his view be relatively simple, but yet it represents a dramatic 'phase change'. This is where the very beginnings of end-directness emerge. Deacon feels we can tell this story by looking at information, thermodynamics, and organization. Within these 3 areas he sees his conception of 'constraint' as a common thread.

Life has to generate regularity, and also has keep that regularity from dissipation. To do this it has to constrain the thermodynamic tendency towards dissipation. The organization must be limited in certain ways. Deacon then describes a molecular model in which interdependent self organizing systems generate constraints (boundary conditions) on each other. The constraints can then be remembered as information and passed on.

Deacon decsribes two relatively simple molecular processes, an auto-catalytic system, and a system of self assembly. Together their produce a capacity for self-repair. Auto-catalysis is a generative process of local asymmetry, but this process will dissipate (due to the 2nd law) if not somehow contained.  The self-assembly process can build shells (or membranes). The self-assembly of a shell is dependent on a local asymmetry of molecules (that is it's constraint. The auto-catalytic process is dependent on some type of physical containment to persist (thus the shell produced through the process of self-assembly serves as it's constraint). In effect the resulting system composed of these two process is able to maintain itself because each produces constraints the other needs. The sub-processes are complementary and inter-dependent.

The type of emergence Deacon has just described fits under the 3rd category bulleted at the top of this post. A novel property (persistence through self-repair) has emerged. One could imagine this theory of complementary and inter-dependent process nesting forward in complex loops until the constraints in the form of information become retained in a stable form like DNA. As each new loop of added inter-connected complexity unfolds a new type of causality emerges into the world. Eventually organisms with nervous systems emerge, and finally those with minimal the higher degrees of sentience.

I think this is a beautiful theory. It is reductive in the sense that its process is simple (perhaps even fundamental), yet the theory can in principle be applied efficiently across many progressions of emergence. Where along this chain, function, meaning, consciousness and purpose emerge are exceedingly difficult questions not soon to be answered in any definitive way. Yet I think this principle of complementary inter-dependent constraints (my phrase) points to a fruitful direction to explore. I also feel it has utility in the mean-time both as a guide for introspection and scientific hypotheses. As Deacon puts it 'life is constantly in the process of changing its own boundary conditions' to me this suggests freedom has evolved through it's dependence on constraint.

While Deacon was heavily influenced by Charles Peirce, it should be evident that his approach aligns nicely with the insights of eastern thought that have been around for over 2,500 years. In his book Incomplete Nature: How Mind Emerged from Matter Deacon begins with a reference to chapter 11 of the tao te ching which speaks to the utility of emptiness.

Back to the video, Dan Dennett voices agreement with the thrust of Deacons approach, Rosenberg unsuprisingly is not. There is a strong hesitancy within the group to let go of the conception of fundamental levels as it applies to 'stuff'. The most vocal is Weinberg. The thrurst of his argument is that while fermions and bosons are not an efficient (or in most even cases possible) means to understand higher level properties, they are still fundamental because they 'entail' the higher level properties (in principle).

Pigliucci asks Weinberg what it is that justifies that belief. Weinberg a Nobel prize winner appeals to historical successes in physics and cites phase transitions. Through statistical dynamics approximations of thermodynamics can be obtained from the level of fundamental particles. Those approximations however, rely on boundary conditions (like temperature and pressure I think) which are properties of the higher level. This is pointed out by Pigliucci at about the 52 minute mark of the video, There is consensus that all higher level phenomena are compatible with the sub-atomic level but disagreement about whether 'entailment' should be implied. I believe this is the trap (bottom-up determinism) that Deacon is attempting to avoid.

Weinberg knows more about fundamental physics than perhaps anyone in the room (Carrol and Levin are also experts), and far more then I could ever hope to know. By listening to the discussion however, I am brought back to Rebecca Goldsteins introductory comments regarding our 'core intuitions'. They are extremely hard to move and maybe especially so for experts. Of course Deacons approach is very much in line with my 'core intuitions' so it is easy for me to find value there, and potentially to miss the value in something Weinberg is advocating.

I think this argument is very important with regard to the future direction of science and if time avails I recommend listening to the entire video.

Moving Naturalism Forward - Part 2 - What is Real?

Introductions continue on this video until the 22:30 mark.

At this point the first topic 'What is Real' is introduced by Alex Rosenberg. Rosenberg lays out a provocative description of his view of reality which would be classified as eliminative materialism.

Rosenberg begins with the claim 'there is nothing to reality but fermions and bosons'. Fermions and bosons are the fundamental particles of physics (fermions are those with mass, bosons those without mass). He then makes the claim that there are two features of physics which are fixed:

1) The denial of any role for teleogy (no backward causation- the future does not pull on the past)
     This includes the denial of purpose.
2) The 2nd law of thermodynamics - The source of all the time assymety in the cosmos

According to Rosenberg 'all cause and effect comes from the fundamental physical level, and any appearance of emergence is temporary ignorance'. He feels fundamental physics 'fixes all the facts'.

These views are not popular in the room. Don Ross points out that fundamental physics theory has nothing to say about the facts of the special sciences. Steven Weinberg then argues that we have need for the term 'real' both in the sciences and everyday use. He says Barak Obama is real, Mitt Romney is real, protons and temperature are real but they are real in different ways. It appears that Weinberg who would certainly be in the reductionist camp is aguing that reality is not absolute.

Dan Dennet points out that there are serious thinkers who have taken the opposite position to Rosenberg. One where colors, tables and chairs, people, consciousness, constitute what is real and fermions and bosons are a product of consciousness. He doesn't think anyone in room holds that position, but points out we need not go completely in the other direction either.

Rosenberg provides a thought experiment for Ross, asking him to imagine taking our earth, moon and sun and all of everthything in between and placing the exact same configuration of the fermions and bosons in another part of the universe. He claims the same facts would be present at all levels except for historical facts. Ross when given the oppurtunity points out that the thought experiment is actually not compatible with what know of fundamental physics. Any section of the universe is only what it is in relation to it's place in that universe. You would have to create an exact replica of the entire universe to replicate any section.

Deacon points out that Rosenbergs view simply eliminates 1/2 of the Cartesian veiw (the teleological half). He points out the meaning from the videos of the conference can have physical efficacy in the world, and will follow up on this ( I think brilliantly) in the next video on emergence.

The discsussion continues with interesting points. Richard Dawkins points out the while design in nature does not have foresight, human design does. I'm sure he believes that human design is a natualistic (part of nature) process. I would be curious where he thinks the line to foresight occurs.

Rosenberg describes meaning and foresight as 'overlay'.

Rebecca Glodstein  is worried about Rosenbergs view that 'if naturalism commits us to eliminating aboutness that we loose all coherence'. We need to be able to say that science is about the world.

I feel this is an interesting discussion and worth a view. I do think however, the discussion could have been more interesting if the focus was not merely to argue against Rosenbergs provocative stance. I don't believe that fermions and bosons constitute a useful conception of absolute reality. I also don't think that consciousness alone is the ultimate reality. I think the interesting discussion lies in the the grey area covered by the dynamic complentary interaction in the way that our sense of what is real depends on our assumptions.

Our senses can fool us and our intuitions contain biases. How can we best combine science and introspection to best make use of them?

Everything is made of fermions and bosons so in one sense they are fundamental.  Yet fermions complement bosons, particles complement waves, and science complements our intuitions to the degree that humility complements our curiosity for discovery.

I would argue that general unifying principles (like complementarity) that posess the capacity for application across reference frames are fundamental in a different sense.

The next video covers the topic of emergence.

Moving Naturalism Forward - Part 1

After posting my introduction a friend asked me if believed in absolute 'truth'. I am just a curious layman myself not a professional philosopher. As it happens however, there was a recent conference of highly respected philosophers and scientists that addressed this question and others.

The conference was called 'Moving Naturalism Forward' - Described here
and the videos of the entire conference are posted here.


This post only covers participant intoductions. In future posts I plan to summarize views presented at the conference and give my take as well.

Comments regarding the participant introductions:

A common thread exhibited by the majority of the participants pertains to a strong cross-disciplinary emphasis in both interest and experience. The philosophers have a strong scientific background and the scientists have an interest in philosophy. The lone participant who focused on one primary field is StevenWeinberg, but I suppose that if you are going to win a Nobel prize, and be considered by many to be the preeminent living theoretical physicist a certain career focus is useful. Jerry Coyne also appears less conversant than others with the lingo of the philosophers which is a bit surprising to me given his hard line public stance on the topic of free will.

Despite the consensus in the group on the general topic of naturalism there does appear to be clear differences present among the participants relating to the topics that will be covered. Terrence Deacon and Don Ross hold the most holistic views which are closest to mine, while Alex Rosenberg appears to hold the most radical reductionist view. I was struck by Rebecca Goldstein’s comments on the resiliency of what she calls core philosophical intuitions. Despite pronouncements of wanting to have minds changed it will be interesting see how the core intuitions that guide each participants belief systems will respond to the arguments presented. I will be mindful of whether the arguments have any effect on the core of my somewhat less informed opinions as well.

I am not sure that there is a guiding goal or purpose to the conference. It is called ‘Moving Naturalism Forward’, but the format is for informal discussion and sharing of ideas on broad philosophical topics related to naturalism. The goal does not appear to be defining some sort of consensus naturalistic views or developing a strategy for communicating ideas to the larger public. Nevertheless the discussions should be interesting.

Those with strong religious allegiances will likely not find much to agree with here.




Day one, Morning Session Video: Introductions by participants
Blow by blow notes on the video:

Nick Pritzker – Pritzker helped organize the event, sees himself as a generalist and is mostly in attendance to observe and learn.

Sean Carroll – Astronomer by training tells of his interest in philosophy in which he was an undergraduate minor. Carroll has written popular books on physics topics and papers on the relationship between science and religion. His view is that being a good scientist requires one to not be religious. He tells a story about book publisher asking if he (Carroll) wanted to write a popular book about physics years ago. When Carroll replies that he would like to write a book about atheism (not physics) the publisher says nobody would buy such a book. The group finds this amusing given the number of high selling books of this type that have come out in recent years. Carroll would like the participants to state something they might change their mind. Carroll is willing to change his mind on the topic of free-will if properly persuaded. Carroll is currently a compatibilist, which means he believes that free will exists despite being a determinist. This is because he sees the best understanding of the free will concept through a theory at the level of people (not fundamental particles).

Richard Dawkins – Zoology at Oxford. Dawkins’ primary interest is in science education, naturalism, and atheism. He would like to be able to change his mind about the possibility of ‘super-naturalism’ but cannot conceive what the evidence would look like. Carroll then jokes that if he changes his mind on that concept then this workshop would have been a failure (again to laughs from the group).

Don Ross – Philosophy of Science, is currently a dean in two economics departments. Ross co-wrote the book ‘Everything must go’, which aims to root philosophy in the best current physics we have available. Ross makes the provocative claim that virtually all analytical philosophy currently taught and practiced in the top schools is nonsense based on false physics. He rejects reductionist accounts of objects and states indicating that we should not expect to specify in a natural language ‘true and interesting things about the general structure universe’. I find it interesting that this is similar to the 1st chapter of the tao te ching which states that the ‘way’ cannot be known through words. Ross is now working on a popular more accessible version of the book. He would like to change his mind about his philosophy of mathematics which he already changes every month.

Alex Rosenberg – Started in physics and moved to philosophy which he now regrets. His current focus is philosophy of biology. Rosenberg views naturalism as incompatible with a philosophy term he introduces called ‘the manifest image’. This term ‘manifest image’ comes up quite a bit in the conference and refers to something akin to an informed version of common sense based on introspection. This is what he would like to change his mind on (so he says anyway). Rosenberg takes a hard line in his book, ‘The atheist guide to reality’. His conclusion is that naturalism commits us to reject almost all that constitutes the manifest image.

Owen Flanagan – Flanagan leads off by saying that he has been trying to change Rosenberg’s ‘mad dog’ mind for a long-time (Rosenberg then chuckles in response). Flanagan feels it would be nice to have a unified theory of how things work. He would like to mesh science and common sense. Flanagan grew up as a nice Catholic boy and has been committed to naturalism since the 1970’s. He has done a lot of work on consciousness and ethics (naturalizing mind & naturalizing morality). Flanagan wants to provide an up-beat philosophy on how we can find meaning in what he calls a fully material world. He is interested in other traditional conceptions classical Chinese and Indian philosophies and how free-will is not an issue from their perspective (which he thinks is a good thing). He also speaks about literature on ‘positive illusions’ and how those with realistic beliefs tend to be more depressed. Flanagan feels that false beliefs are always the enemy but sometimes worries about this feeling.

Simon DeDeo – DeDeo trained as a physicist, but branched out into animal and human behavior. He tries to take methods of physics seriously when studying social systems. De Deo believes that mental states are multiply realizable (functionalism) and he focuses more on explanation than prediction. DeDeo would like to change his mind on his current belief that mental states do not reduce to computations.

Terrence Deacon – Deacon began in physics, but quickly moved to cybernetics, information theory, and then to the philosophy of Charles Peirce. He went to study at Harvard where Peirce’s work had been taken place, but after arriving found no one there was interested in the work at the time. Deacon then went to MIT and was taken on by a neuroscientist and moved into biological anthropology. He worked in the field of cross transplantation (pigs, monkeys, humans) which he later regretted for various reasons including non-disclosure forms. Through the 90’s Deacon work was driven by the attempt to discover what it is that differentiates human brains from other animals. He wrote an important book called ’The symbolic species’ which layed out a theory for the evolution of language. Around 2000 Deacon moved to Berkeley and re-immersed himself in earlier work with Peirce and the study of the evolution and emergence of new functions in brains. He has often been invited by religious groups to discuss his work on emergence and feels the dialogue is important. This is likely because Deacon feels there is a place in naturalism and science for teleology (purpose). Deacon is interested in the question ’How is it that a molecule becomes about something’ and doesn’t think brains are like computers (our understanding of computation is not big enough to account for meaning). Deacon indicates he is willing to be convinced, but has not seen convincing science regarding a computational model for the human brain.

Rebecca Newberger Goldstein – Goldstein humorously describes being brought up as a ‘very’ good Jewish girl. She states that the idea of an ‘ambitious girl’ was inconceivable in her families culture. The book ‘our friendly atom’ rocked her world as a little girl. Her greatest hope was to someday meet a scientist. Goldstein read Bertrand Russell’s ‘Why I am not Christian’ at age 12 and describes it as so good that it worked on a Jew. She started out in physics but couldn’t get around her need to interpret quantum mechanics philosophically so she moved into philosophy. She was later influenced by Tom Nagel’s ‘What does it feels like to be bat’. Goldstein is very interested in peoples ‘core’ intuitions and how inflexible they can be. She felt this issue could be best addressed in philosophical novels through characters. She is convinced by the implications of Goedel’s work leading to mathematical realism and also the view that core philosophical intuitions cannot be resolved. She would like to be unconvinced of both.

Dan Dennett – Dennett came from a family that focused on the humanities not the sciences. He was interested in science, but was not encouraged to pursue that direction. Only in graduate school did he decide it might be useful to know something about the brain when doing philosophy on the mind. Dennett describes this as a novel idea at Oxford at that time. He then describes spending more time at Oxford studying science than philosophy and describes how he received his education from a world class list of science tutors through informal relationships. Like Flanagan, Dennett is appalled by what he calls the armchair philosophy of mind currently en-vogue. He describes that the job of a philosopher is to help people with putting the manifest image together with the scientific image. ‘We know it doesn’t go easily’. Ross points out that if the goal is the bring the two concepts together (manifest & scientific ) it is important not to put restrictions on the latter to accommodate the former. Dennett feels that free will is a pivotal issue and states ‘It is the literal non-metaphorical truth that compatabilism is true’. He states he would like to have his mind changed or a case made for why the manifest image should be usurped by the scientific image.

Massimo Pigliuchi – Training and serving as a biologist for 20 yrs with 100 publications, Pigliucci tells of a mid-life crises that led him to NY city where he pursued and obtained a PHD in philosophy. Science and philosophy are described as both originally belonging to the field of ‘sceintia’ what used to refer to the larger concept of knowledge acquisition. His view is that the best we can do is to intellectually respect both science and philosophy. Pigliucci is currently writing a book about progress in philosophy. Talking of how he has ‘sparred’ with several of those in the room, Pigliucci quotes Hume; ‘Truth springs from argument amongst friends’. He also tells of how he has changed his mind recently regarding certain aspects of meta-physics based on Ross’ book ‘Everything Must Go.

David Poepple – Began in cell biology and linguistics, then became an actor, then became a neuroscientist and runs a lab at NYU in human brain science. His focus is on the temporal structure of perceptual experience. He Is impressed by many fields (cog psych, philosophy, etc…) in what has been achieved, but feels neuroscience has failed for the moment. ‘Maps are getting better but the conceptual resolution has not’.

Jennifer Willette - Science Writer Specializing in physics– Grew up in an evangelical religious family. She is mainly here to observe and is more interested in what may come out of this type of conference than in rehashing old arguments religion vs science over and over again.

Jerry Coyne – Evolutionary Biologist – Became atheist in reaction to what he calls religionists. He is writing a book on the incompatibility between science and religion. Coyne state specifically that he is here to address the question of free will. He describes himself as one of the few incompatibalists in the room (along with Rosenberg feels free will is an illusion). ‘We are collations of molecules that obey the laws of physics and sometimes it appears that we do that rationally, but a lot of times we do not’. ‘Our decisions are made by internal factors we do not understand’. Coyne states he would like to change his mind to believe there are other ways of knowing besides science. On the other hand he indicates he would like to think that science answers all questions which would boost his arguments against religion. Coyne asks for jargon to be limited as he has no idea what humuncular functionalist means.

Steven Weinberg Nobel prize in particle physics 1979 – Always wanted to be a theoretical physicist. Works in quantum field physics and cosmology. Indicates he doesn’t have a good understanding of what ‘reality’ and ‘naturalism’ mean (wide open mind). Knows what consciousness and mathematics but doesn’t see how they fit into natural science. As for emergence morality and free will he has strong views that are unlikely to change.

Jenna Levin is a physicist who is late to arrive and will introduce herself at that time.

Introduction to this blog

Hello and welcome to 'The Missing Complement'.

This is my first attempt at blogging so this in part will be an experiment to see if a not so young dog can learn a new trick. I expect things will improve as I become accustomed to the medium.

I am curious by nature, and often find myself wanting to share or consolidate many of the interesting bits and pieces of information I come across by following that curiosity. I also find myself from time to time wanting to write down some thoughts related to one topic or another. It could be a new interesting scientific finding, a philosophical insight, or just something someone posted on Facebook that I would like to delve into.

I am a statistician of sorts, and a Tai Chi instructor for many years. My interests span from eastern philosophy to the various sciences (physics, biology, neuroscience, complexity theory, psychology, etc...).

The name 'The Missing Complement' is a nod to Neils Bohr (the father of the atom) and his philosophy of complementarity, as well as to the similar eastern philosophical concepts described by the complementary support of yin and yang in Taoism, and the Buddhist concept of interdependent arising.

Bohr's principle of complementarity arose in response to the wave/particle duality paradox associated with quantum mechanics. The principle claims that objects of knowledge contain complementary properties. Knowledge of a property depends upon the reference frame of the observer, and knowledge of one property excludes the simultaneous knowledge of the other.

Similarly, in the first chapter of the Taoist classic 'The Tao Te Ching' it is suggested that the 'way' that can spoken is not the 'true way'. This in part seems to be getting at the idea that objective cognitive knowledge and subjective experience are complementary.

While quantum mechanics has never failed an experimental test, and makes extremely accurate predictions there is no universally accepted interpretation of wave particle duality. Words are also relative in the sense that each word is defined and gains meaning only in the context of other words, all interpreted within the reference frame of our cumulative subjective experience. With this in mind it should be apparent that conceptual certainty is always context dependent. If we are certain of any concept without awareness of our ideological biases we will be blind to the 'missing complement'.

Perhaps we can only move closer to 'truth' by accepting the limits of both our experience and our knowledge, while at the same time humbly working to expand each aspect in support of the other.

It is in the spirit of this principle that I am creating this blog.