The discussion of the topic of morality was introduced in two parts by Rebecca Goldstein, and Steven Weinberg respectively.
As I have with the other discussions I will try to sumarize the disscussions first and my comments will follow.
The video can be found here:
Goldstien sees the issue of whether or not we can 'ground' morality as a non-issue. She indicates we have been doing it, there is a 'forward movement' and philosophy in her view has played an important role in that progress. Richard Dawkins and others will later chime in showing agreement with a collective historical progression of morality. As an example of the forward movement of morality Dawkins points out that T.H. Huxley, who was extremely progressive considering 19th century norms would have never even considered that black people could be intellectually comparable to white people, Goldstein decribes how we look back with 'horror' on the accepted morality in even the quite recent past. She reccounts how a person in the room admitted that as a young man he took it as a given that women could not do math and physics. Jenna Levin then smart quips 'which one of you said that'? So the session gets off to a good natured start as the response is laughter.
Goldstein continues, suggesting that our grandchildren will look back on some our current actions with the same horror. She points out that once progress is made we almost never go back. Using slavery as an example there was one reversal with Napoleon for a short time. She says historically, 1st philosophers point out a moral problem, then there is something that effects a larger public awareness. In case of slavery she points to Lockes argument against slavery which preceded the novel 'Uncle Toms Cabin' which had a huge effect. 'There is a place for reason here'.
Goldstein says she is interested in the work of evolutionary psychology and Johnathan Haidt, although she strongly disagrees with his conclusions. Evolutionary psychology can help inform why we hold some of the moral intuitions we do, but reason is necessary to consider if we ought to hold them. The response of disgust which probably evolved in response to things like food borne pathogens is used as an example. Out of that intuitive response the morality of purity was probably born. Goldstein herself was brought up to moralize around foods and initialy had a 'moral revulsion' to lard. Reason however has allowed her to see the irrationality of that response. She also cites group loyalty, and authority as examples. One defining point is that 'moral psychology without moral philosophy is insufficient'. Her second point is that we can ground our morality in the fact that we matter. From that place moral reasoning can expand (to others).
Steven Weinberg agrees we can reason about morality, but we cannot 'ground' morality in reason or science. There are no absolute moral postulates. Weinberg is arguing against the case made by Sam Harris that moral postulates can be grounded in science. He also argues that even nice people lack coherent moral postulates, by using himself as an example. In highschool Weinberg held a utilitarian stance (the greatest happyness, for the most people). He then read 'Brave New World' in which a world was portayed where every one was happy, but there was no justice, no culture, no search for meaning. This led him to see shortcomings in the utilitarian posture. Other examples include his loyalty to his family, and his moral feelings relating to evil and vengence. Vengence is not problematic to Weinberg in that he believes evil should be punished for its own sake above and beyond the value gained from deterence or societal protection. Weinberg sees 'no algorythm' for balancing things like 'happyness and truth', 'loyalty and distributive justice'. At one point he concludes that this is not a problem, 'so what, thats OK'. He also concludes however, that 'we have to live the unexamined life', and 'this is part of the tragedy of the human condition'. It seems Weinberg feels we cannot reason our way to moral philosophy because there are no absolute moral postulates. Goldstein agrees there are no absolute postulates, but that does not imply that reason can not play an important role for reason in the unfolding of morality.
Massimo Pigliucci agrees with Weinberg with regard to the limits of utilitarianism and his criticism of Sam Harris's position. He points out that there are ethical frameworks (virtue ethics, communitarianism) that address the family loyalty dilemma. He states that moral reasoning in philosophy is not hinged to grounding morality on a bedrock or to providing universal answers. It is instead a way of thinking things through. In ethics we do have to start with some assumptions or axioms, but this true for everything we do (science, math, logic). Pigliucci reccomends the books of Michael Sandel as a useful example of how to reason in this way. He also cites Peter Singers 'Exanding Circle' as an approach to the problem of our distrust for others. Weinberg is unconvinced, and unable to see how a rational process can inform his core moral feelings. Dan Dennet points out that not all rational processes are 'fact finding processes'.
Don Ross points out how the process that informs our moral values is extemely complex at multiple levels, yet we are pretty good at it. Ross highlights an interesting personal example of dramatic moral progress. When he was a child his parents held the view that gay people were on a level with criminals. They held the belief that gays should not be allowed to participate in society. His parents who are still living now hold a typical liberal view and have gay freinds. He feels this was a very gradual process 'there was no magic line crossed' Due largely to a societal process in which we all are continuosly indoctrinating each other change took hold. Goldstein makes an important point that I felt she had skimmed over before. In addition to the top-down societal pressure that Ross describes a bottom-up spark for change often comes from those who are being wronged through their organizing and advocating for justice. She notes that (other) animals can't do this.
Owen Flanagan then brings two import ideas together that provide insight to the discussion that has been ongoing. The first idea is that of an absolute foundational approach to morality, which he points out most naturalists are trying to avoid. The second idea relates to how science can inform moral philosophy. Hume, as Flanagan points out, famously declared 'we cant demonstrate moral facts'. The is known is the naturalistic fallacy, 'is does not imply ought'. Flanagan shows that Hume made this declaration in response to moral clerics who were advocating foundational morality. Hume then continues with 200 pages of moral philosophy, but not with the goal of demonstrating anything in a foundational sense. Flanagan suggests that while it is not logical to think we can derive moral facts from science, we can us science to becomed more informed regarding our nature. The better we are informed regarding our nature the better we can negotiate with each other. Pigliucci agrees pointing out that Hume felt morality was grounded in human nature, and Pigliucci adds that human nature itself is contantly evolving. He points out that Hume recognized that human nature evolves through culture well before the time Darwin.
Terrence Deacon breifly brings the discussion back to the topic of the prior day. He points out that just about everything being discussed could fall under the category of emergence. David Poepple points out in response that 'fermions don't make moral judgements, people do'. He is puzzled by the discontinuity between talking about individual psychology and moral group dynamics. Sean Carroll points out that we can study naturalistically what people do (through psychology), but that does not determine what they should do. We are back to 'is vs ought again'.
This for me has been another intersting and informative discussion. I think there was considerably more agreement then disagreement among the participants. All participants seem to agree that moral values have been progressing in a positive direction historically. All the participants also seem to believe that there are no absolute moral postulates and therefore it is not productive to go about moralizing in that way. I even think that think all participants agree that reason and science play some role in the agreed upon progression of moral values. I think the primary place where Steven Weinberg clearly disagrees with most others in the room is in regard to the ability of individuals to influence thier own core moral values through reason. This one initial difference however, leads to what I see as an important limiting condition with regard to the philisophical stance that 'we have to live the unexamined life'. People can agree for the most part on what they are looking at, but depending on the frame of reference what is subjectively viewed can seem quite different.
Most appeared to agree that it is important to examine our assumtions, axioms, and biases when balancing the way we think about moral values. This is what I would like to see explored in more depth. I think we can make efficient moral progress if we go about the art of living with this in mind. I also think the concept of complentarity can be very useful in this process. If our assumptions lack a full conception of the dynamics involving the complentary and oppositional ideas present in a given problem then our moral stance will be incompletely informed and biased in some way. In my view bias will always be present to some degree. I feel strongly that we can cultivate a way of living that increases our awareness and reduces our bias.
I am now going to give some examples of how I might apply this concept drawing in part from Terrence Deacons presentation on emergence.
In the simple molecular model Deacon described a system comprised of two sub-processes that complemented each other through their opposition. He describes the complementary opposition as each process constraining the other. The creative process of autocatalysis is constrained by the shell formed from the self assembly process. The self assembly is dependent on (and thus constrained by) what is produced. Together the sub-processes forms a whole and each sub-process 'matters' to the other. This forms a nice metaphor for the 'mattering' which Goldstein refers to as her ground for moral values.
The whole of this simple model however will need further constraints to become a living system. The shell for example will need a degree of permeability to allow energy from the outside to keep it's systems working. The whole of the simple system needs to communicate, and in a sense cooperate with it's environment. In more complex living organisms the organism depends on its cells for life, and the cells depend on the organism to provide ongoing sources of energy. Now we have a very early stage metaphor for selfishness and altruism. Orgnanisms tend to survive natural selection when thier cells are not too greedy or invasive, but instead are constrained to benefit from a balance that allows the organism to flourish. While most relationships between species in nature are symbiotic, some are parasitic. In either case I think the metaphors are informative and useful, but we need to remember that every moral problem is unique. Once again is does not imply ought.
We should not be surprised that human nature expresses itself with both selfish and altruistic traits. According to the taoist concept of complementarity the exisitence of one requires the other. The question then is not whether human nature is intrinsicly selfish or altruistic. The better question which our conscious process affords is, 'how can we balance these traits so that they complement each other'?
There is no foundational answer to that question. The value we give each answer will depend on the contextual details of the problem at hand, and the reference frame in which we view it. So then another series of important questions appear; 'What are my assumptions', 'How might my frame of reference be biased', 'How might I complement my reference frame to constrain its bias? It is very difficult to see the bias in our reference frame as it is the lens though which we look. With that as a given I think it is best to make use of all of our tools; our reason, our science, and our introspection with a receptivity to the idea that there will always be a 'missing complement' waiting to be discovered. From my frame of reference that is not a 'tradgedy', but a simultaneously practical and elegant path toward progress.
Edit: The discussion on morality continues into the next video
Don Ross presents a very interesting real world example pertaining to the issue of vengence. I will at some point describe that in another post and than continue to address some of the examples of moral problems brought up in the discussion.
Update:
Here is a nice link on some eastern meditative approaches or practices intended to improve our tools for ethical behavior.
Practical Ethics
No comments:
Post a Comment